

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0319

E O 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR  
SUBJ: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF  
JUNE 7, 1978

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE JUNE 7, 1978 INFORMAL  
SESSION OF THE VIENNA TALKS, THE ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED  
BY THE BELGIAN, UK AND US REPS AND THE EAST BY SOVIET  
REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV, CZECHOSLOVAK REP KEBLUSEK, AND  
POLISH REP STRULAK. MILITARY ADVISORS WERE ALSO PRESENT.  
DURING THE SESSION, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES  
PRESENTED THEIR RESPONSE TO THE WEST'S PROPOSALS OF  
APRIL 19, AND EXPLAINED THE MERITS OF THESE PROPOSALS.  
WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD SOME PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS  
ABOUT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES  
REPLIED TO EARLIER DATA QUESTIONS BY THE WEST AND ASKED  
SOME FURTHER QUESTIONS. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES REPLIED  
TO SEVERAL EARLIER EASTERN QUESTIONS ON WESTERN DATA AND  
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ASKED A NUMBER OF FURTHER QUESTIONS. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS  
ALL MATERIAL ON THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS AND THE EASTERN  
DATA REPLIES AND QUESTIONS. WASHINGTON AGENCIES ALREADY  
HAVE SUBSTANCE OF WESTERN QUESTIONS ON DATA POSED IN THIS  
SESSION (SEE MBFR 309). END SUMMARY.

US REP AS HOST WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS. HE

SUGGESTED THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS MIGHT WISH TO START THE PROCEEDINGS. OR, IF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS PREFERRED, THE WEST COULD BEGIN WITH SOME DATA QUESTIONS. THE EAST INDICATED IT WOULD LIKE TO LEAD OFF.

POLISH REP SAID FIVE YEARS WILL HAVE ELAPSED IN THE COMING AUTUMN SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE STARTED IN VIENNA. TO PUT IT FRANKLY, THIS WAS NOT A SHORT PERIOD. NEVERTHELESS, NO MATERIAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THIS PERIOD. MORE THAN THAT, THE PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT IN PRACTICE PROCEEDED TO ELABORATION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THIS PROBLEM, WHICH WAS SO IMPORTANT FOR THE EUROPEAN NATIONS.

NATURALLY, SUCH A SITUATION COULD NOT BUT CAUSE CONCERN. THIS WAS THE MORE SO SINCE THE QUESTION CONCERNED THE AREA WHERE THE TWO LARGEST GROUPINGS OF ARMED FORCES WERE CONFRONTING EACH OTHER AND WHERE MILITARY TENSIONS WERE PARTICULARLY GREAT AND DANGEROUS. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES DID NOT INTEND NOW TO DWELL AT LENGTH ON THE CAUSES OF THIS OBVIOUSLY ABNORMAL SITUATION WHICH HAD ARISEN AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD MORE THAN ONCE REFERRED TO THEM IN GREAT DETAIL ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS.

POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, SINCE THE SUBMISSION ON APRIL 19 OF THEIR NEW PROPOSALS, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN STATES HAD BEEN TRYING TO PRESENT THEM AS THE SECRET

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MEANS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THEIR DEAD POINT AND THUS, TO CONTRIBUTE TO REACHING AN AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, A THOROUGH AND OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THESE PROPOSALS GAVE ONE ALL THE GROUNDS TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH THEY DID TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, FOR INSTANCE, REGARDING THE NEED TO SPECIFY THE TIMING FOR THE COMPLETION OF A PHASE II FORCE REDUCTIONS, ON MAJOR CARDINAL ISSUES, THE WEST STILL REMAINED ON ITS OLD POSITION, FORMULATED AS FAR BACK AS 1973. THE DEMAND FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH STILL REMAINED IN FORCE, WAS AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE. THE SOVIET UNION WAS STILL REQUIRED TO REDUCE ALREADY IN THE FIRST PHASE ITS GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL BY AN ARBITRARILY CHOSEN AND UNFOUNDED NUMBER OF 68,000 MEN, WHILE THE US IN RETURN WOULD WITHDRAW ONLY 29,000 MEN.

POLISH REP CONTINUED, THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE REDUCTIONS METHOD OR PATTERN ALSO CONTINUED TO DIVERGE, IN PRINCIPLE REMAINING DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET FORCES, ACCORDING TO THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT, SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN MAJOR FORMATIONS, WHILE THE US FORCES IN SMALL UNITS AND SUB-UNITS AND QUITE A PORTION BY INDIVIDUAL SERVICEMEN.

POLISH REP SAID THAT, SIMILARLY, THE WEST HAD  
NOT INTRODUCED ANY CHANGES IN ITS APPROACH TO THE ISSUE

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OF ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS. IT CONTINUED TO INSIST ON THE WITHDRAWAL  
OF 1700 SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN EXCHANGE FOR 1,000 US  
NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY.  
AS BEFORE, ALL REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS  
OTHER THAN THE USA TOTALLY REFUSED TO UNDERTAKE ANY  
GENUINELY MUTUAL COMMITMENTS WHICH WOULD INDICATE THE  
GENERAL AMOUNT OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED BY EACH OF THEM.

POLISH REP SAID THAT, HAVING IN MIND WHAT  
HAS JUST BEEN STATED, AS WELL AS OTHER DEFICIENCIES IN  
THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ON  
APRIL 19, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT AGREE WITH THE  
VIEW THAT THESE PROPOSALS COULD BE TAKEN AS THE BASIS  
FOR REACHING AN AGREEMENT. THE WESTERN APPROACH CONTINUED  
TO IMPEDE THE ELABORATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE  
UNDERSTANDINGS AND REQUIRED A SERIOUS REVISION.

POLISH REP SAID THAT, IN CONTRAST SUCH AN  
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APPROACH, THE SOCIALIST STATES ADVOCATED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE GENERAL MUTUAL AND EQUIVALENT REDUCTION OF BOTH ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THIS GOAL HAD BEEN PURSUED THROUGH ALL THE PROPOSALS SO FAR SUBMITTED BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. IN HIS SPEECH MADE ON 25 APRIL OF THE PRESENT YEAR, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, LEONID BREZHNEV, HAD STATED QUOTE AT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS NOW, WE HAVE BEEN STRIVING TO CONSIDERABLY DECREASE THE LEVELS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WEST AND THE EAST IN EUROPE WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE. BUT IN RESPONSE, WE HAVE BEEN MEETING ONLY WITH ATTEMPTS ON THE PART OF THE WEST TO CHANGE THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN ITS FAVOR. WE ARE READY TO DO EVERYTHING DEPENDING ON US IN ORDER TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FOR LESSENING MILITARY TENSIONS IN THE AREA WHERE THEY ARE ESPECIALLY GREAT AND DANGEROUS. UNQUOTE.

POLISH REP SAID THAT THE DESIRE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN THE FIELD OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAD BEEN DECLARED BY THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE ROSTRUM OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT NOW BEING HELD.

POLISH REP SAID THAT, AFTER NECESSARY CONSIDERATION, IN ORDER TO GIVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND TO SHIFTING THEM TO THE STAGE OF WORKING OUT A SPECIFIC AGREEMENT, THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
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AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, HAD DECIDED TO PUT FORWARD NEW PROPOSALS OF PRINCIPAL IMPORTANCE. THIS INITIATIVE, TAKING CONSTRUCTIVELY INTO ACCOUNT A NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, PROVIDED A MANAGEABLE BASIS FOR WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY STATE PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, AND THIS WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE, THE INITIATIVE REMOVED CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN THE WESTERN REDUCTIONS SCHEME. IN THE PRESENT INFORMAL SESSION, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WISHED TO INFORM WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN A PRELIMINARY WAY ABOUT THE NEW

PROPOSALS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GDR, POLAND AND THE  
USSR WHICH THEIR CO-AUTHORS INTENDED FORMALLY TO SUBMIT  
IN THE NEXT PLENARY SESSION.

POLISH REP THEN DISTRIBUTED THE FOLLOWING  
TEXT. HE SAID THAT AS WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD  
NOTE THE TEXT WAS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE ORIGINAL,  
WHICH WAS IN RUSSIAN. POLISH REP PROCEEDED TO READ THE  
TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

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PROPOSALS BY THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE  
POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC;  
AND THE CZECHOSLIVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC SUBMITTED ON " " JUNE, 1978.

GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO ENSURE PROGRESS AT THE VIENNA  
NEGOTIATIONS AND TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT,  
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC,  
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK  
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC ARE SUBMITTING NEW PROPOSALS.

IN DOING SO, THEY PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF AN  
EQUAL-PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND FROM THE FACT OF THE  
EXISTENCE OF AN APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH  
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES  
IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AS WELL AS FROM THE NECESSITY TO UNDERTAKE

EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR DECREASING THE HIGH CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THIS AREA.

GIVEN THE AGREEMENT OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO THE  
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PRINCIPLE OF AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION AND TO THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES, THE SIDES COULD, DURING 3-4 YEARS, REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES BY AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL PERCENTAGE (THE WEST BY 91,000 MEN, AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES BY 105,000 MEN). IN THIS PROCESS ALONG THE STATES-DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. AFTER THE REDUCTION, THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY STATES WOULD EACH HAVE IN THE REDUCTION AREA AN EQUAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH IN THEIR ARMED FORCES -- 900,000 MEN INCLUDING 700,000 IN GROUND FORCES.

THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN TWO STAGES.

THE FIRST STAGE

(1) IN THE FIRST STAGE, WHICH WILL BE OF A DURATION OF ONE YEAR, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY 7 PERCENT OF THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH (THE USSR BY APPROXIMATELY 30,000 MEN AND THE USA BY APPROXIMATELY 14,000 MEN).

(2) IN THIS CONTEXT, THE USSR WOULD REDUCE AND WITHDRAW TO ITS TERRITORY ONE ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS WITH SUPPORT AND SERVICE UNITS, TWO DIVISIONS AT FULL STRENGTH AND A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL TANK UNITS AND SUBUNITS, EQUIVALENT TO ONE TANK DIVISION, AS WELL AS 1,000 TANKS AND 250 MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES.

(3) THE USA WOULD WITHDRAW TO ITS TERRITORY TWO-THREE BRIGADES, WHILE THE REMAINING FORCES SUBJECT TO REDUCTION WOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN THE FORM OF OTHER UNITS AND SUBUNITS. IN ADDITION, THE USA WOULD REDUCE 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS, 36 "PERSHING"

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MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND 54 F-4 DELIVERY AIRCRAFT.

(4) AFTER THE REDUCTION OF THE USAN AND USSR ARMAMENTS REFERRED TO IN THE PRESENT PROPOSALS, THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE NUCLEAR WARHEADS, THE QUANTITY OF "PERSHING" MISSILE

LAUNCHERS AND F-4 DELIVERY AIRCRAFT OF THE USA AS WELL AS THE QUANTITY OF SOVIET TANKS WOULD BE LIMITED AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL.

(5) UPON SIGNING THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD EXCHANGE LISTS SPECIFYING THE ACTUAL IDENTIFICATION, THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND THE LOCATION OF THE FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUBUNITS SUBJECT TO REDUCTION.

(6) IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT, THE STATES OTHER THAN THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION IN A SECOND STAGE, TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE COURSE OF THE 2-3 YEARS AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE FIRST STAGE.

(7) THE SCOPE OF THE REDUCTION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH STATE INDIVIDUALLY AND WOULD BE DETERMINED FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE APPROXIMATELY PROPORTIONATE TO THE TOTAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES.

(8) COLLECTIVE LEVELS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHIN THE LIMITS INDICATED ABOVE AND UNDER THE OBSERVANCE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES:

-- FIRSTLY, THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTIONS WHATSOEVER, WOULD BE COVERED BY THESE COLLECTIVE LEVELS, I.E., NATIONAL LIMITATIONS WOULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF ANY OF THE STATES, INCLUDING THE USSR AND THE USA;

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-- SECONDLY, IN THE CASE OF A POSSIBLE UNILATERAL REDUCTION IN THE FORCES OF ANY OF THE STATES, NO OTHER STATE PARTICIPATING IN THE REDUCTION AND BELONGING TO THE SAME GROUPING WOULD BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE ITS FORCES BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT

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OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN REDUCED  
BY ITS ALLIES, AND MUST NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, AS A RESULT  
OF SUCH AN INCREASE, REESTABLISH OR, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY,  
EXCEED THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH IT HAD BEFORE  
THE REDUCTION.

-- THIRDLY, THE POS-REDUCTION RESIDUAL NUMERICAL  
STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF EACH STATE COULD NOT BE RAISED  
THROUGH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MILITARY POSITIONS OCCUPIED  
BY CIVILIANS IN PEACE-TIME.

(9) ALL PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD UNDERTAKE  
A REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE WOULD CARRY  
IT OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT ELABORATED AS A RESULT  
OF THE SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS, OR, IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT  
HAD NOT BEEN REACHED, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE METHOD OF REDUCTION  
OF FORCES ESTABLISHED FOR THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE FIRST  
STAGE AGREEMENT. IF THIS METHOD WERE TO DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY  
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FROM THAT ENVISAGED FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF THE USSR  
AND THE USA, THESE TWO STATES-PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT  
TO CONSIDER THEMSELVES AS NO LONGER BOUND BY THE OBLIGATIONS  
UNDERTAKEN BY THEM IN THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT.

SECOND STAGE

(1) DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SECOND STAGE, ALL  
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD REDUCE  
THEIR FORCES BY 40 PERCENT OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH  
OF THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED.



(2) DURING THE SECOND-THIRD YEARS THE ABOVE-MENTIONED STATES WOULD REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES BY THE REMAINING 60 PERCENT.

(3) IN THE SECOND STAGE, THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD FURTHER REDUCE A QUANTITY OF FORCES WHICH, IN PERCENTAGE TERMS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE FIRST STAGE, WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE PERCENTAGE OF THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF ALL THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY-POLITICAL GROUPING.

#### GENERAL PROVISIONS

(1) AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE PROCES OF REDUCTION IN THE FIRST AND SECOND STAGES, IT WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED TO CARRY OUT A RELOCATION OF THE REMAINING INDIVIDUAL MILITARY FORMATIONS WITHIN THE REDUCTIONS AREA AT THE DISCRETION OF ONE OR ANOTHER STATE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE THE OVERALL QUANTITY OF GROUND FORCE FORMATIONS AND UNITS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO THE REDUCTION.

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(2) ALL OTHER ASPECT OF THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES - DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHICH ARE NOT DEALT WITH IN THESE PROPOSALS REMAIN AS PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED.

CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID HE WOULD NOW LIKE TO PRESENT SOME CLARIFICATIONS ON THE JUST MENTIONED NEW PROPOSALS BY THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. FIRST OF ALL, IT WAS NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE THAT THESE PROPOSALS TOOK INTO ACCOUNT A NUMBER OF VERY IMPORTANT ISSUES WHICH, AS WESTERN REPS HAD BEEN POINTING OUT DURING THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN A FIRST AGREEMENT. FIRST, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WERE DECLARING THEIR CONSENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OUTCOME OF REDUCTIONS OF EQUAL COLLECTIVE LEVELS FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AT 900,000 MEN IN EACH SIDE, INCLUDING 700,000 MEN IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT, SECONDLY, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE EXPRESSING THEIR READINESS TO CONFINE REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCE MANPOWER TO GROUND FORCES, WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF AN UPPER MAXIMUM LEVEL. THIRD, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO CARRY OUT IN STAGE 1 SELECTIVE ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THOSE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN SPECIFIED BY THE WESTERN SIDE FOR THE PHASE I REDUCTIONS BS THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION.

CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT, FOURTH, THE USSR WAS PREPARED TO CARRY OUT ITS FORCE REDUCTIONS IN STATE 1 BY THE FORMATIONS PROPOSED BY THE WEST, WHICH MEANT, BY DIVISIONS. FIFTH, THE EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR STAGE 1 PROVIDED, AS IT WAS DONE BY THE WESTERN PROPOSALS, THE

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SAME RATION OF US AND SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS, WHICH WAS IN THE PROPORTION OF 1 TO 2. THE EAST AHD TAKEN CONSTRUCTIVELY INTO ACCOUNT SOME OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE WESTERN SIDE AS WELL.

CZECHOSLIVAK REP CONTINUED THAT, AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS PRESERVED THOSE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPORTANT ELEMENTS WHICH HAD ALWAYS CONSTITUTED THE BASIS OFR THE WESTERN POSITION AND WITHOUT WHICH, NO GENUINELY EFFECTIVE AND EQUIVALENT REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE COULD BE ENSURED. THE FOLLOWING WERE THE MAIN ELEMENTS INVOLVED: FIRST, RECOGNIZING AS THE STARTING POINT FOR AN AGREEMENT OF FORCE REDUCTIONS THE FACT OF REALITY THAT, IN CENTRAL EUROPE THERE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AND EXISTED AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES. SECOND, THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE FORCE REDUCTIONS

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BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND OF A SIMILAR PATTERN OR METHOD IN THEIR REDUCTIONS. THIRD, THE REQUIREMENT THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES SHOULD TAKE DEFINITE PART IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WHICH MEANT THAT EACH OF THESE STATES SHOULD MAKE AN INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONATE TO ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL. FOURTH, THE NEED FOR ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS NATURALLY PROVIDED THAT THE PATTERN OR METHOD, SPECIFIC AMOUNT, AND COMPOSITION OF THEIR REDUCTIONS, WOULD BE DETERMINED IN EACH OF THE TWO STAGES. FIFTH, CONSISTENT AND STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS, WHICH IN PARTICULAR HAD FOUND ITS REFLECTION IN THE FACT, HAVING ACCEPTED, IN ORDER TO BRING THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES CLOSER, THE WESTERN IDEA OF COLLECTIVE LEVELS FOR THE ARMED FORCE MANPOWER OF THE TWO MILITARY GROUPINGS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD ENVISAGED THAT SUCH LEVELS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS OF THESE GROUPINGS, INCLUDING THE USSR AND THE USA.

CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT, AT THE SAME TIME, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THEIR NEW PROPOSALS REDRESSED SERIOUS DEFECTS OF THE WESTERN REDUCTIONS SCHEME WHICH COULD UNDERMINE THE RELIABILITY AND EFFICIENCY OF A FUTURE AGREEMENT. AS AN EXAMPLE, ONE MIGHT NOT ETHE FOLLOWING. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT IN THE OUTCOME OF REDUCTIONS OF EQUAL, COLLECTIVE LEVELS FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, EASTERN REPS DEEMED IT NECESSARY TO ENVISAGE SIMULTANEOUSLY SUCH PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD NOT PERMIT ANY DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATE IN THE FUTURE TO RESTORE OR EXCEED ITS FORCE MAMPOWER EXISTING PRIOR TO THE REDUCTIONS.

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CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THE NEW PROPOSALS MADE BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE PRESENT SESSION PROVIDED A REALISTIC WAY TOWARDS THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND COULD UNDOUBTEDLY LEAD TO A BREAK-THROUGH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BY ESTABLISHING GENUINELY A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND COMPROMISE BASIS FOR REACHING AN AGREEMENT. IF THE WESTERN STATES POSITIVELY REACTED

TO THESE NEW PROPOSALS, THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED WITHOUT DELAY TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THAT BASIS. NATURALLY, PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES DEPENDED ON AN UNDERSTANDING ON DATA, WHICH MEANT ON THE WEST'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY ON THE ARMED FORCE MANPOWER OF THE TWO GROUPINGS IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THIS PROVISION WAS SPECIFICALLY EMPHASIZED IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS.

CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HOPED THAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD EXAMINE THE NEW EASTERN INITIATIVE REFLECTING THE GOOD WILL OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR INTEREST IN THE EARLY REACHING OF AN AGREEMENT AND THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT IT AS THE BASIS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WHICH WERE CO-AUTHORS OF THE NEW PROPOSALS WERE PREPARED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS WHICH THE WEST MIGHT HAVE NOW OR IN THE FUTURE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INITIATIVE.

TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE NOW PREPARED EITHER TO LISTEN TO WESTERN STATEMENTS OR TO ANSWER QUESTIONS OF THE WEST ON THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OR TO ANSWER WESTERN QUESTIONS FROM THE EARLIER SESSIONS ON DATA.

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US REP THANKED EASTERN REPS FOR THIS EXPOSITION OF THEIR PROPOSALS. WESTERN REPS WOULD STUDY PROPOSALS CAREFULLY. ON THIS OCCASION, HE WISHED TO ASK A FEW PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS.

US REP SAID THAT PARA 3 OF THE FIRST SECTION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS STATED THAT "WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ACCEPTING AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION PRINCIPLE AND THE APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE" AND SO ON. DID THIS MEAN THAT THE PROPOSAL REQUIRED THAT WEST ACCEPT AS A FACT THAT AT PRESENT THERE EXISTED APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES? OR DID IT MEAN THAT APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES ON EACH SIDE WAS THE GOAL OF REDUCTIONS AND THAT THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS WOULD IN FACT BE DETERMINED BY THE AGREEMENT ON DATA ON WHICH THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WERE CONDITIONED?

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TARASOV REPLIED, AS WAS KNOWN, THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF APRIL 19 WERE MADE CONDITIONAL ON AN UNDERSTANDING ON DATA. FROM THE PROVISION OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF APRIL 19 CONCERNING THE PHASE I REDUCTIONS, IT COULD BE SEEN THAT THE WEST UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS AGREEMENT ON DATA SHOULD BE REACHED ON THE BASIS OF ACKNOWLEDGING THE EXISTENCE OF DISPARITIES. ACCORDINGLY, THE EAST'S OWN PROPOSAL PRESENTED IN THE PRESENT SESSION ENVISAGED REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING ON DATA ON THE BASIS MAINTAINED BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, WHICH CORRESPONDED TO THE REALITY EXISTING AT PRESENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THAT IS, THE EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES ON EACH SIDE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

US REP ASKED, DID THIS MEAN THAT IF, AS A RESULT OF THE DATA DISCUSSION, THE TWO SIDES REACHED AGREEMENT THAT, IN FACT, THERE WAS A GREATER NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE AREA, THAT THE WARSAW PACT WOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE LEVEL OF 700,000 MEN?

TARASOV SAID HE HAD A COUNTER QUESTION TO WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES. IF, AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSION, THE EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY OF STRENGTH OF THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED, WOULD THE WEST MAINTAIN ITS REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL OF 68,000 SOVIET FORCES FROM THE AREA IN THE FIRST STAGE, OR WOULD IT CHANGE THIS DEMAND?

US REP SAID THE WEST'S POSITION WAS THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN WHICH WERE NECESSARY TO REACH AN EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF 700,000 GROUND FORCE MILITARY MANPOWER ON EACH

SIDE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE WEST WAS GUIDED BY THE FACTS WHICH ACTUALLY EXISTED.

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TARASOV SAID THE EAST WAS ALSO GUIDED BY THE FACTS WHICH EXISTED. US REP ASKED, TTHEN DID HE UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY IN THE EAST'S PRESENT PROPOSAL THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD REDUCE TO PARITY OF 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE AND THAT THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS WOULD DEPEND ON FACTS WHICH WOULD BE AGREED ON BY THE TWO SIDES, ON WHATEVER AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AS TO THE EXISTING LEVEL OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA?

TARASOV SAID THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, AS US REP HAD CORRECTLY NOTED, PROVIDED FOR ESTABLISHMENT AS A RESULT OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, OF EQUAL COLLECTIVE LEVELS. THAT IS, 900,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE, INCLUDING 700,000 MEN IN GROUND FORCES. FOR THE FIRST STAGE, THE EAST'S PROPOSALS ENVISAGED EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND US FORCES BY 7 PERCENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE ISSUE OF THE RESULTS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION WOULD INFLUENCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROVISIONS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

US REP SAID THE SAME WOULD LOGICALLY BE TRUE AS TO THE SECOND STAGE. TARASOV SAID, YES.

US REP SAID TURNING NOW TO COMPUTATION OF THE PERCENTAGE IN THE SECTION ON STAGE 1 OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, PARA 1 STATED THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REDUCE GROUND FORCES BY 7 PERCENT OF THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH. WAS IT CORRECT THAT THIS MEANT THAT EACH OF THESE TWO PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE GROUND FORCES BY 7 PERCENT OF ITS OWN NUMERICAL STRENGTH?

TARASOV SAID THIS WAS CORRECT. THE EAST WAS SPEAKING OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES' GROUND FORCES.

US REP SAID PARA 4 OF THE STATE 1 SECTION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDED THAT SOVIET TANKS WOULD BE LIMITED IN THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL. THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO THE

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RESIDUAL LEVEL OF MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES. WHAT WAS PROPOSED IN THIS REGARD?

TARASOV SAID SUCH A LIMIT WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR IN  
THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, A SUBSTANTIAL  
REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES AND THEIR LIMITATION AT THE REDUCED

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LEVELS WOULD NOT PREDICTABLY REQUIRE THE INCREASE OF MECHA-  
NIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES.

US REP SAID THAT IN THE STATE 2 SECTION 2 OF THE NEW EASTERN  
PROPOSALS, PARA 3 PROVIDED THAT "THE USA AND THE USSR WOULD  
FURTHER REDUCE IN THE SECOND STAGE SUCH NUMBER OF FORCES  
WHICH, WITH THE COUNT OF THEIR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST  
STAGE WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE PERCENTAGE OF FORCE REDUCTION  
BY ALL OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM A RESPECTIVE MILITARY/  
POLITICAL GROUPING" WAS IT CORRECT THAT THE PERCENTAGE  
REFERRED TO HERE WAS COMPUTED BY DIVIDING THE TOTAL GROUND  
FORCE REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE TWO PARTICIPANT GROUPINGS  
BY THEIR STARTING FIGURE. THAT IS, BY THE LEVEL OF GROUND  
FORCE MANPOWER AT THE STARTING POINT? IN OTHER WORDS, IF  
THE EAST STARTED ACCORDING TO ITS DATA, AT 805,000, THE  
PERCENTAGE WOULD BE COMPUTED BY DIVIDING 805,000 BY 105,000  
WHICH APPEARED TO RESULT IN ABOUT 13 PERCENT?

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TARASOV SAID THIS PARA PROVIDED AS FOLLOWS: THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FIRST AND SECOND STAGES SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY A PERCENTAGE EQUAL TO THE PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GROUPS. THIS MEANT, FOR EXAMPLE, IF ONE TOOK THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES, THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS, THE LATTER WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY 105,000 MEN IN ORDER TO REACH THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL OF THEIR GROUND FORCES AT 700,000 MEN. THESE 105,000 MEN SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONT THE FOUR DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE WARSAW COUNTRIES BY AN APPROXIMATE EQUAL PERCENTAGE. SINCE THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ALREADY PROVIDED FOR REDUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE FIRST STAGE, THEN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE IN THE SECOND STAGE SUCH AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF FORCES WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED, IF ONE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT REDUCTIONS ALREADY TAKEN IN THE FIRST STAGE, TO MAKE THE PERCENTAGE OF SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONATE TO THE PERCENTAGE OF FORCE REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONATE TO THE PERCENTAGE OF FORCE REDUCTIONS BY EACH OTHER WARSAW TREATY PARTICIPANT. A SIMILAR PROVISION WAS ENVISAGED FOR THE US.

US REP ASKED DID THIS MEAN THAT EACH WARSAW TREATY PARTICIPANT WOULD REDUCE ABOUT 13 PERCENT OF ITS FORCES AND EACH NATO PARTICIPANT ABOUT 11.5 PERCENT? TARASOV SAID YES.

US REP SAID HE WISHED TO REFER TO PARA 6 IN THE SECTION ON STAGE 1. THIS STATED THAT "THE STATES, OTHER THAN THE USA AND THE USSR, WOULD UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS IN A STAGE 1 AGREEMENT TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE WITHIN TWO TO THREE YEARS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF A FIRST STAGE". PARA 7 OF THIS SECTION STATED "THE SCOPE OF REDUCTION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH STATE INDIVIDUALLY AND WOULD BE DETERMINED FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN SUCH A WAY

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AS TO BE APPROXIMATELY PROPORTIONATE TO THE TOTAL FORCE NUMERICAL STRENGTH." DID THIS MEAN THAT THE COMMITMENT BY THE WESTERN STATES OTHER THAN THE US WHICH WOULD BE MADE IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD ONLY BE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL OR WOULD THESE PARTICIPANTS BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS AS WELL?

TARASOV SAID PARA 6 OF STAGE 1 OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDED THAT STATES OTHER THAN THE US AND THE USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS IN A STAGE 1 AGREEMENT AS REGARDS GENERAL REDUCTION OF THEIR GROUND FORCES IN A SECOND



STAGE, BUT NOTHING WAS ENVISAGED HERE AS REGARDS REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. HOWEVER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EAST'S GENERAL APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT IS, TO THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS TOGETHER WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WITH WHICH THEY WERE EQUIPPED. THAT IS, THIS WAS THE EAST'S APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE AND THE EAST WOULD MAINTAIN THIS IN THE SECOND STAGE.

US REP ASKED WHETHER HE WAS RIGHT IN UNDERSTANDING THERE WOULD BE NO COMMITMENT IN THE FIRST STAGE BY NON-US AND NON-SOVIET DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN RESPECT OF ARMAMENTS?

TARASOV SAID HE ALREADY SAID THAT PARA 6 OF THE EAST'S PROPOSAL DID NOT PROVIDE FOR DIRECT COMMITMENTS IN STAGE 1 AGREEMENT OF STATES OTHER THAN THE US AND THE USSR IN RESPECT OF REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMAMENTS AS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THIS AGREEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, TARASOV WISHED TO DRAW ATTENTION TO PARA 9 OF THE EAST'S PROPOSALS, WHERE IT WAS STATED THAT -ALL PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD UNDERTAKE THEIR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE WOULD CARRY IT OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT ELABORATED AS A RESULT OF THE STAGE 2 NEGOTIATIONS."

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US REP SAID THAT PARA 9 ALSO PROVIDED THAT "IN

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CASE SUCH AN AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED", REDUCTIONS WOULD BE  
"IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FORCE REDUCTION PATTERN SPECIFIED  
FOR THE USSR AND THE USA IN A STAGE 2 AGREEMENT". THIS SEEMED  
TO BE AN ALTERNATE WAY OF PROCEEDING. COULD TARASOV EXPLAIN?

TARASOV SAID THE UNDERLYING IDEA OF THE EAST'S  
PARA 9 RESEMBLED THAT OF THE PROVISION OF THE WESTERN PRO-  
POSALS OF APRIL 19 WHICH ENVISAGED THAT, IN CASE NO AGREEMENT  
HAD BEEN REACHED AS A RESULT OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, ALL  
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NEVERTHELESS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES  
WITHIN THE FIXED TIME TO REACH THE AGREED LEVELS. THE  
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FROM THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD  
THEMSELVES ADVOCATED THE NEED TO LIMIT THE SECOND STAGE  
REDUCTIONS BY FIXED AGREED TIMING AND IN THIS CONNECTION THEY  
HAD NATURALLY CONSIDERED THAT PART OF THE PROPOSALS OF THE  
WESTERN STATES AS A CONSTRUCTIVE ONE. HOWEVER, IT WAS NATURAL  
THAT IN CASE AN AGREEMENT ON THE SECOND STAGE HAD NOT BEEN  
REACHED, AT LEAST THE MORE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE REDUCTION  
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OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BY COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US  
AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE EASTJ PROPOSAL  
WAS THAT, IN THE EVENT THAT SUCH A STAGE 2 AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN  
REACHED AS A RESULT OF SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS, FORCES SHOULD  
BE REDUCED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REDUCTION METHOD SPECIFIED  
FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US IN A STAGE 1 AGREEMENT. THIS  
MEANT THAT ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS OF AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE  
TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A WAY SIMILAR TO THE SOVIET UNION  
AND THE US. THAT IS, BY UNITS AND SUBUNITS, AND, LIKE THE  
SOVIET UNION AND THE US, THEY WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE PART OF  
THEIR ARMAMENTS. ONLY IF SUCH A METHOD OF REDUCTIONS  
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERED FROM THAT ENVISAGED FOR THE US  
AND THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD THESE TWO STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO  
CONSIDER THEMSELVES FREED FROM OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN A  
FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. THIS LAST PROVISION WAS VERY  
IMPORTANT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE THE  
POSSIBILITY FOR THE WEST TO EXPRESS ITS OPINION ABOUT WHETHER  
THE FORCE REDUCTION METHOD (EDIT: ADVOCATED) BY THE SOCIALIST  
STATES WAS SATISFACTORY OR NOT SATISFACTORY FOR THE  
WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AND WOULD PROVIDE A SIMILAR POSSIBILITY  
FOR THE EAST TO EXPRESS ITS OWN POINT OF VIEW ABOUT WHETHER

THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS OF WESTERN FORCES WAS SATISFACTOR TO THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. THUS, AS WESTERN REPS COULD SEE THE EAST'S APPROACH TO THE METHOD OF FORCE REDUCTIONS BY PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US WAS RATHER FLEXIBLE SINCE IT PROVIDED FOR DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES OF SOLVING THESE ISSUES.

US REP SAID, AS REGARDS THIS LAST POINT, IF THE SOVIET UNION FELT THAT THE PATTERN OF NON-US WESTERN REDUCTION DIFFERED FROM THAT ENVISAGED FOR THE USSR, WOULD THE SOVIET UNION THEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONSIDER ITSELF FREED FROM ALL OBLIGATIONS, THAT IS FROM MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AS EWLL AS SECRET

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ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS?

TARASOV SAID YES. THE SOVIET UNION ENVISAGED THAT IT WOULD BE FREED FROM ALL COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN STAGE 1 BOTH WITH REGARD TO ARMAMENTS AND MANPOWER.

US REP SAID IN DETERMINING WHETHER SUCH A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE EXISTED, WOULD THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BE COMPARED WITH STAGE 1 REDUCTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION OR WITH THOSE UNDERTAKEN BY THE US?

TARASOV SAID THE COMMITMENTS PROVIDED FOR BY EASTERN PARTICIPANTS FOR THE USSR AND THE SOVIET UNION IN A STAGE 1 AGREEMENT WERE OF THE SAME TYPE. THEREFORE, IT WAS QUITE NATURAL THAT THE METHOD OF REDUCTION BY BOTH THE US AND THE SOVIET FORCES WOULD IN THIS CASE BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. NATURALLY, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT PROPOSE THAT CANADA OR LUXEMBOURG SHOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES BY DIVISIONS OR BRIGADES. ALSO EASTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT REQUIRE COUNTRIES WHICH DID NOT POSSESS NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WARHEADS. HOWEVER, SUCH A PROVISION WOULD GIVE AN ADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO ELABORATION OF A STAGE 2 AGREEMENT.

US REP SAID, WITH REGARD TO PARA 8 IN THE SECTION ON STAGE 1, THE THIRD SUBPARAGRAPH READ "RESIDUAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES OF EACH STATE SHOULD NOT BE INCREASED BY MEANS OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF MILITARY POSITIONS FILLED IN PEACETIME BY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL". WOULD TARASOV EXPLAIN THIS PROVISION? DID THIS MEAN A FREEZE ON SOME PART OF THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL?

TARASOV SAID, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PROPOSAL, A FREEZE OF THAT PART OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WAS ENVISAGED WHO WERE FILLING MILITARY POSITIONS WHICH COULD BE FILLED BY CIVILIANS IN PEACETIME. HE BELIEVED THAT THE IDEA OF THIS

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PROPOSAL WAS QUITE CLEAR. IT PROVIDED A POSSIBILITY TO

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS BEL PRIORITY

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AVERT A PROBABLE CONCEALED INCREASE IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH  
OF ARMED FORCES BY MEANS OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF MILITARY  
POSITIONS WHICH COULD BE FILLED IN PEACETIME BY CIVILIANS?

BELGIAN REP SAID HE HAD A SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION  
WITH REFERENCE TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 9 IN THE STAGE 1  
SECTION. TO WHAT KIND OF COMMITMENTS DID THE PROPOSALS REFER  
WHEN IT SAID THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE FREED OF THE COMMITMENTS?  
DID THIS REFER TO STAGE 2 COMMITMENTS OR THOSE ALREADY  
IMPLEMENTED IN STAGE 1.

TARASOV SAID, TO THOSE ALREADY IMPLEMENTED IN STAGE 1.

AT THE REQUEST OF WESTERN REPRESENTATIVE TARAWOV PRESENTED  
FOLLOWING REPLIED TO DATA QUESTIONS ASKED BY WESTERN REPRESENTA-  
TIVES, AND CONTINUED WITH FURTHER QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

NOW WE WILL ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ASKED ON MAY 30, 1978  
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INFORMAL MEETING BY AMBASSADOR BOLLAND.

QUESTION 1 CONCERNED THE ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL OF DEPOTS, MAJOR STORAGE FACILITIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE CENTERS SUBORDINATE TO THE HQ OF MILITARY DISTRICTS IN THE GDR, PPR AND CSSR TO THE FIRST CATEGORY.

ANSWER. YES, THE UNDERSTANDING SET FORTH BY AMBASSADOR BOLLAND IN HIS QUESTION OF THE 30TH OF THIS MAY IS CORRECT.

QUESTIONS 2 AND 3 CONCERNED THE PERSONNEL OF THE BEZIRK AND KREIS STAFF OF THE GDR AND OF PROVINCIAL STAFF OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

ANSWER. PERSONNEL OF THE BEZIRK AND KREIS STAFF OF THE GDR AND OF PROVINCIAL STAFF OF CSSR AS IT IS THE CASE WITH PERSONNEL OF WOJEWODSTWO STAFF OF PPR, HAVE BEEN COUNTED BY US IN THE CATEGORY OF MAJOR FORMATIONS SINCE THOSE STAFF ARE ASSIGNED TO MILITARY DISTRICTS OF THESE COUNTRIES.

QUESTIONS 4 AND 5 CONCERNED PERSONNEL OF TRAINING UNITS AND SUBUNITS OF THE SOVIET FORCES.

ANSWER. ALL PERSONNEL OF TRAINING UNITS AND SUBUNITS OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA ARE ASSIGNED TO ARMIES AND, THEREFORE, HAVE BEEN INCLUDED BY US IN THE FIRST CATEGORY. THIS IS EQUALLY TRUE FOR BOTH PUPILS AND INSTRUCTORS.

QUESTIONS 6 AND 7 PERTAINED TO CONSCRIPT PERSONNEL AND PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS UNDERGOING TRAINING IN TRAINING UNITS AND SUBUNITS OF THE PPR, GDR, AND CSSR.

ANSWER. PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PPR, GDR AND CSSR REFERRED TO IN THE QUESTION HAVE BEEN COUNTED BY US WITH THE  
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UNITS AND SUBUNITS TO WHICH THEY ARE PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED.

2. NOW WE'LL ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ASKED AT THE SAME MEETING BY AMBASSADOR RESOR.

QUESTION 1 WAS ABOUT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS AND SUBUNITS PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR SOVIET ARMIES IN THE GDR.

ANSWER. YES, ALL PERSONNEL OF ALL SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS  
AND SUBUNITS PERFORMING FUNCTIONS REFERRED TO BY AMBASSADOR  
RESOR AND SIMILAR TO

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THEM IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF SOVIET ARMIES IN THE  
GDR ARE ASSIGNED TO THOSE ARMIES AND THEREFORE  
HAVE BEEN COUNTED IN THE FIRST CATEGORY.

QUESTION 2. CONCERNED PERSONNEL OF SERVICE  
SUPPORT UNITS AND SUBUNITS PERFORMING HOUSE-  
KEEPING AND MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS.

ANSWER. SUBUNITS AND COMMANDS PERFORMING  
HOUSE-KEEPING AND MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS, INDEED,  
ARE NOT ASSIGNED TO ARMIES. SIMILAR FUNCTIONS ARE  
PERFORMED IN ARMIES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES BY  
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. AFTER IT WAS AGREED UPON  
THAT ALL UNIFORMED PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ALLOCATED  
TO THE CATEGORY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WE HAVE IN-  
CLUDED ALL PERSONNEL OF SUCH SUBUNITS AND COMMANDS  
IN COUNTING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF SOVIET FORCES  
IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

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PERSONNEL OF THE SAID SUBUNITS AND COMMANDS PERFORMING SERVICE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS FOR SOVIET ARMIES AND LOCATED IN THEIR LOCATION SITES (AREAS) HAVE BEEN INCLUDED BY US IN THE FIRST CATEGORY. PERSONNEL OF RESPECTIVE SUBUNITS AND COMMANDS PERFORMING SERVICE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS FOR UNITS AND SUBUNITS DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE HQ OF THE GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE GDR AND IS LOCATED IN THEIR LOCATION SITES HAVE BEEN COUNTED IN THE SECOND CATEGORY.

QUESTION 3 WAS WHETHER THE GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE UNITS HAD BEEN COUNTED IN FIGURES FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

ANSWER. PERSONNEL OF ALL GROUND-BASED UNITS OF THE AIR DEFENSE ARE ALLOCATED, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED, TO GROUND FORCES.

QUESTION 4 PERTAINS TO ALLOCATION OF RADAR AND COMMUNICATIONS UNITS PROVIDING SUPPORT TO MORE THAN ONE BRANCH OF SERVICES.

ANSWER. AS WE ALREADY STATED TO YOU ON JULY 5, 1977, PERSONNEL OF SUPPORT UNITS AND SUB-UNITS AND, THUS, OF RADAR AND COMMUNICATION UNITS AS WELL, PROVIDING SUPPORT BOTH TO GROUND AND AIR FORCES HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

3. FOR OUR TURN WE'D LIKE TO PUT SEVERAL QUESTION TO WESTERN DELEGATIONS.

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QUESTION 1. AMBASSADOR BEHRENDT ON FEBRUARY 15, 1977 AND AMBASSADOR SMOLDEREN ON APRIL 14, 1978 IN REPLY TO OUR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL OF THE AIR DEFENSE UNITS OF BELGIUM, THE FRG, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UK BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES STATED THAT THE MILITARY UNIFORM CRITERION HAD BEEN TAKEN AS A BASIS FOR ALLOCATION. WE'D LIKE TO FURTHER ASK:

- IN WHICH OF THE TWO FORCE CATEGORIES HAVE BEEN COUNTED PERSONNEL OF ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNITS WHOM THE WEST, REGARDLESS OF SUBORDINATION, HAS ALLOCATED TO GROUND FORCE MAMPOWER?

- IN WHICH CATEGOR HAVE BEEN INCLUDED PERSONNEL OF SSM UNITS ORGANIZATIONALLY ASSIGNED TO THE AIR FORCE?

- IN WHICH CATEGORY HAVE BEEN INCLUDED PERSONNEL OF SAM UNITS WHICH ARE NOT SUBORDIANTE TO ARMY CORPS, BEING ASSIGNED TO THE AIR FORCE?

- IS OUR UNDERSTANDING CORRECT THAT PERSONNEL OF MISSILE AND ARTILLERY UNITS, AS WELL AS OF AIR DEFENSE, COMMUNICATION AND SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS DIRECTLY SUBORDINATED TO ARMY CORPS HAVE BEEN INCLUDED BY YOU IN THE FIRST CATEGORY?

QUESTION 2. ON APRIL 3 AMBASSADOR RESOR IN REPLY TO OUR QUESTION CONCERNING THE INCLUSION OF PERSONNEL OF THE FRG TERRITORIAL DEFENSE COMMANDS IN THE FIGURES FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER SAID THAT "THE ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL OF THE FRG TERRITORIAL ARMY HAD BEEN COUNTED IN THE SECOND CATEGORY, I.E. PERSONNEL OTHER THAN IN MAJOR SECRET

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FORMATIONS". WE WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY WHETHER WE UNDERSTANDIORRECTLY THAT PERSONNEL OF REGIONAL AND DISTRICT STAFF (VERTEIDIGUNGSBEZIRKSKOMMANDO UND

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00  
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USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS BEL PRIORITY  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY

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VERTEIDIGUNGSKREISKOMMANDO) AS WELL AS UNITS AND  
SUBUNITS SUBORDINATE TO THEM HAVE BEEN COUNTED BY  
YOU IN FIGURES FOR ARMED FORCE MANPOWER AND HAVE  
BEEN INCLUDED IN THE SECOND CATEGORY.

QUESTION 3. IN THE FRG AIR FORCE THERE ARE  
SEVERAL COMMANDS SUCH AS AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND, AIR FORCE  
LOGISTIC SUPPORT COMMAND AND OTHER. AS  
WE KNOW, EACH OF THESE COMMANDS HAS ITS UNITS AND  
OTHER FORMATIONS.

WE WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY IN WHICH FORCE CATEGORY OF THE AIR  
FORCE PERSONNEL OF THESE COMMANDS, THEIR UNITS AND OTHER FORMA-  
TIONS HAVE BEEN COUNTED.

QUESTION 4. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER PERSONNEL OF ALL  
MAJOR FORMATIONS ASSIGNED TO THE 4TH ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCE  
HAVE BEEN COUNTED IN FIGURES FOR THE US AIR FORCE MANPOWER. ARE  
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THERE ANY MAJOR FORMATIONS ASSIGNED TO THIS COMMAND PERSONNEL  
OF WHICH HAVE BEEN COUNTED NOT FULLY BUT PARTIALLY, AND IN  
WHICH AIR FORCE CATEGORY HAVE THEY BEEN COUNTED?

QUESTION 5. IS OUR UNDERSTANDING CORRECT THAT ALL PERSONNEL  
OF THE US GROUND FORCE FORMATIONS AND UNITS IN THE REDUCTION  
AREA SUBORDINATE TO ENGINEER CORPS COMMAND, MEDICAL COMMAND,  
ARMY THEATER SUPPORT COMMAND, ARMY LOGISTIC SUPPORTCOMMAND, ETC.  
HAVE BEEN INCLUDED BY US IN THE SECOND CATEGORY?

QUESTION 6. WE'D LIKE ALSO TO KNOW WHETHER YOU HAVE COUNTED  
IN FIGURES FOR MAJOR FORMATIONS PERSONNEL OF ALL DEPOTS,  
STORAGE FACILITIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE CENTERS SUBORDINATE TO  
ARMY CORPS OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE WESTERN ACONTRIES.  
IF SOME OF PERSONNEL OF THESE DEPOTS, STORAGE FACILITIES AND  
ADMINISTRATIVE CENTERS HAVE BEEN COUNTED BY YOU IN THE SECOND  
CATEGORY, WHAT THE PRINCIPLE HAVE YOU CHOSEN FOR DIVIDING THESE

PERSONNEL BETWEEN THE TWO CATEGORIES?RESOR

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## Message Attributes

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